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Summary 
Following wage rises in 2001 and 2002, the statutory minimum wage 
increased in real terms by about 70%, and in 2006 it grew by 5.5%. 
Differentiation by qualifications – as proposed by the government – will take 
effect from July 2006. 
There is a statutory minimum wage in 19 out of the 25 EU member states, 
while six member states have no such regulation. Where the amount of the 
minimum wage is differentiated, it is usually on account of lower levels of 
productivity (e.g. in the case of people only starting out on their careers) that a 
lower-than-average minimum wage is set. 
The impact of a rise in the minimum wage cannot be predicted precisely 
on the basis of economic theories. International experience also varies, although 
significant increases have led to a decline in employment in almost all cases. 
After the increases in the minimum wage introduced in Hungary in 2001 and 
2002, employment did not decline across the national economy as a whole, but 
the number of people employed in certain sectors did drop substantially. This 
affected primarily smaller enterprises, unskilled and older employees, and 
regions with high rates of unemployment. The minimum wage increase did not 
reduce the budget deficit because businesses could balance the increase in their 
costs by slightly increasing tax avoidance. 
A higher minimum wage can reduce poverty by increasing the income of 
people on the minimum wage in poor households by more than the average 
rate. The majority of people on the minimum wage, however, live in medium or 
higher-income households. Most poor people are not affected by any increase in 
the minimum wage since they are unemployed. 
The increase in the minimum wage in 2006 could affect some 700,000 to 
900,000 people. The economic environment is better today than it was in 2001 
and 2002, but this increase is based on a larger amount, so it could lead to a 
perceptible decline in employment, with reduced chances of employment 
primarily for unskilled and older people with lower productivity.  
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1. Introduction  
As in many other countries, proposals to increase the minimum wage are 
made quite often in Hungary. When it comes to the anticipated consequences, 
however, views are divided. Many consider such a measure to be an effective 
tool in reducing poverty; others regard it as a move that will result in 
deteriorating employment rates. It goes without saying that the impact of an 
increase in the minimum wage is a complex one and the form it takes depends 
on a large number of factors. In this paper the authors provide a theoretical and 
empirical overview of such factors in order to facilitate a reliable forecast of the 
impact of the increase in the minimum wage that is planned for 2006. 
The impact of introducing and increasing a minimum wage can be 
assessed and interpreted in a variety of theoretical economic frameworks. 
According to neo-classical models, increasing the minimum wage reduces 
employment, because employees whose performance falls short of the new 
minimum wage level will be made redundant. Those who prefer other models, 
however, might argue that there is no perfect competition on the labour market, 
and if enterprises can influence wages then a rise in the minimum wage need 
not have a negative impact, and indeed may even result in increased 
employment rates. However, even these models reveal a level of the minimum 
wage above which any increase will have a negative impact.  
 The findings of empirical research projects carried out in Hungary show 
that a large increase in the minimum wage does tend to have more of a negative 
impact. Hungary has already seen a very substantial increase: in 2001–02 the 
government then in office practically doubled the minimum wage. The impact of 
that measure has been assessed in numerous studies, and the findings show that, 
on the whole, employment was adversely affected, the employment opportunities 
for people in less advantageous positions deteriorated, and the effects on the 
budget also proved negative.  
This study sums up the factors that determine effects on employment 
and other aspects, along with the domestic and international experience relating 
to the issue in hand. First of all, we provide a review of the recommendations of 
international organizations and the practices of EU member states. The second 
section summarizes the available technical literature relating to the minimum 
wage. This is followed by a description of international and domestic empirical 
research programmes that focus on the impact on employment, the budget and 
redistribution. Finally, drawing on the theoretical and empirical conclusions, 
the authors will attempt to predict the possible effects of the government’s 
proposal. 
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2. International practice and recommendations  
There is a wide variety of minimum wage systems. In some countries the 
minimum wage level is prescribed by law; in others it is determined by formal 
or informal consultations between employers and employees. The level of the 
minimum wage may, in some countries, vary according to the age of the 
employee, occupation and/or family status, or the region of employment, etc. 
2.1. International practice  
As a percentage of the average wage,1 the rate of the minimum wage currently 
in operation in Hungary is not low by international standards (Figure 1). The 
40.7% rate is higher than in the USA or the UK, and also higher than the rates in 
effect in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, which are important to us as 
a basis for comparison.  
Figure 1: Minimum monthly wage as a proportion of average monthly earnings in 
industry and services (%) 
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Source: Eurostat online database, downloaded on 18 October 2005. 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1073,46870091&_dad=portal&_schema=P
ORTAL&p_product_code=av_mmw  
                                                 
1 Average wage of employees in industry and services. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of full-time wage earners on the minimum wage (%) 
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Source: Eurostat online database, downloaded on 18 October 2005. 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1073,46870091&_dad=portal&_schema=P
ORTAL&p_product_code=pc_mmw  
 
A review of the proportion of full-time employees on the minimum wage 
reveals a similar picture (Figure 2). This indicator shows the effectiveness of the 
minimum wage – that is, its proximity to the average wage level that would 
exist without regulation. Aside from the minimum wage, however, it is also 
affected by levels of schooling and by the age profile of employees, and 
therefore it may be relatively high in less well developed economies, even if 
there is no effective minimum wage. As a Eurostat publication notes (Regnard, 
2005), in EU member states a higher minimum wage results in higher 
proportions of people on the minimum wage (exceptions to this being France 
and Luxembourg).  
A statutory national minimum wage has been introduced in 19 of the 25 
EU member states. In most of these countries the level has been set with some 
form of differentiation. 
Table 1: The practices in setting and differentiating minimum wages in the EU member 
states, 2005 
 Basis of 
differentiation 
Minimum 
wage*  
Country  
No minimum wage    Austria, Germany, 
Denmark, Finland, 
Italy, Sweden 
No differentiation  —  Hungary, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Portugal, 
Slovenia 
Based on average 
productivity 
   
Based on age and under 16 years of age  30–50% Netherlands, Slovakia 
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service period   
 under 17–18 years of 
age  
70–95% France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, 
Slovakia 
 under 22–23 years of 
age  
45–85% Belgium, United 
Kingdom, 
Netherlands 
 during the first 6–24 
months of 
employment  
80–95 % Czech Republic, 
Poland, Cyprus 
Altered working 
capability  
total disability pension  
 
partial disability 
pension  
75% 
 
50% 
Czech Republic,  
 
Slovakia  
Casual workers and 
outworkers  
casual workers and 
outworkers  
 Spain 
Qualifications, sector, 
trade 
people with 
qualifications, for 16 
areas (wage councils)  
120% 
 
100+– 
Luxembourg,  
 
Malta 
Position Mandatory wage 
tariff of 12 elements  
 Czech Republic  
Based on fairness     
Service period and 
family status  
0–15 years of service; 
with spouse 
100–123% 
+13% 
Greece  
Hazardous job  115 % Latvia  
Source: European minimum wage survey, European Industrial Relations Review, August 
2005.  
Note: *As a proportion of the general minimum. 
2.2. Recommendations of international organizations  
EU and ILO recommendations concerning the minimum wage  
One document of relevance to a possible optimum level of the minimum 
wage is the European Social Charter of the Council of Europe. The charter 
declares that everybody has the right to a wage ‘sufficient for a decent standard 
of living’, without offering a more specific definition. The independent expert 
body supporting implementation of the Charter has formulated a more specific 
recommendation, according to which the optimum level of the net minimum 
wage is 60% of the national net average wage,2 and is definitely higher than the 
                                                 
2 The most frequently applied method in comparing minimum wage systems studies the ratio 
of minimum wage to average wage. This ratio is known as the ‘Kaitz index’. 
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poverty line. If it is below 60% but can be shown to be above the poverty line, 
50% may be acceptable as a minimum.  
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) sets out two general 
expectations concerning the minimum wage. On the one hand, it should be in 
line with wages, the cost of living, social transfers and the general standards of 
living; on the other hand it should be in line with economic growth, 
productivity and the need for a high rate of employment. 
Employment policy guidelines of the European Union, 2005–08  
The EU recommendations affecting all member states do not tackle 
increases in the minimum wage, but most of the guidelines formulate goals 
whose attainment is complicated by increased minimum wage levels: 
a) The rate of employment should be raised (target: 70%) 
b) Employment-friendly labour cost increases should be ensured by creating 
effective wage-bargaining systems, by reviewing and reducing social 
contribution burdens – especially among low-paid workers 
c) Young people should be assisted in joining the labour market, and the 
economic activity of older people should be stimulated  
d) Employment should be made more attractive by reducing disincentive 
elements of tax and welfare systems, by improving job-seeking services, 
and by boosting those social services that facilitate labour market 
integration  
e) The flexibility of the labour market and job security should be 
strengthened jointly. This involves clamping down on employment in the 
‘black’ economy and facilitating the launch of businesses 
Country-specific Council recommendations 2004  
The recommendations specifically targeted at Hungary call for greater 
adaptability on the part of employees and entrepreneurs, for employment to be 
made more attractive, and for investment in human capital to be promoted in 
order to raise the low level of employment, and especially to boost the 
employment of older people. There is no reference to a minimum wage among 
the measures aimed at making employment more attractive. The 
recommendation suggests that a reform of the welfare system and of services in 
the health insurance system should be introduced to make employment 
worthwhile and to cut down on the level of ‘black’ employment. 
In summary, neither the international recommendations nor the ratios of 
the minimum wage to the average wage observed in other countries appear to 
justify any increase in the existing level of the minimum wage in Hungary. 
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3. Theoretical background  
In models that assume perfect competition and symmetrically informed 
economic actors,3 any increase in the minimum wage always has a negative 
impact on employment. A rise in the minimum wage broadens the range in 
which it is no longer worth employing a worker because the receipts from the 
product or service generated by the employee fall short of the wage that must 
be paid to the employee. This reduces the flexibility of the labour market, as it 
prevents wages being cut when such a move is necessitated by deteriorating 
market conditions; under such circumstances, businesses can only respond to 
change by cutting their headcount. Other models may show positive impacts on 
employment, such as in the case of the so-called local monopsony model, where 
the enterprise concerned is the only buyer on the market.  
A rise in the minimum wage may result in a general wage increase, even 
if the minimum wage is fixed below the equilibrium level of the average wage. 
This has a direct impact on those employees on the lowest wages, while other 
workers will feel the indirect effect if enterprises try to maintain wage 
differentials as a means of motivation or for some other reason. 
3.1. Effect of the minimum wage in classical economics 
In the classical model of the labour market, the assumption of perfect 
competition means no enterprise can affect wages, and thus both the 
equilibrium wage and the level of employment are determined by the 
intersection of the curves of labour demand (D) and labour supply (S) (Figure 3). 
As wages (W) increase and as supply grows, so earnings decline. Labour is 
homogeneous, i.e. employees are identical in all relevant respects – including 
qualifications and skills – and therefore all of them earn the same wage. 
According to this model, the equilibrium employment level is E0, before 
the introduction of a minimum wage, at a wage level of W0 (Figure 3). If a 
minimum wage is introduced that is higher than the equilibrium wage (Wm), 
demand for labour will drop to Em and at the same time the number of people 
who would be willing to work for the higher wage will increase to Sm. At a 
given level of the minimum wage, the more flexible the demand for labour is 
(the flatter the D curve), the more substantial the decline in employment will be. 
On this point, Brown et al. (1982) noted that, instead of reflecting the whole of 
the oversupply (Sm–Em), the unemployment statistics will only show the 
number of people actively looking for jobs at the increased wage level. 
                                                 
3 Under the conditions of perfect competition, no employer can materially influence the wage 
level: wages are determined by supply and demand. In the case of symmetrical information, 
the employer knows just as much about the capabilities and the actual performance of the 
employee as does the employee himself. 
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Figure 3: Labour supply and demand in the classical model  
 
Source: Brown et al. (1982). 
3.2. The effect of the minimum wage in the monopsony model  
Models that jettison one of the fundamental assumptions of the classical 
theory – perfect competition on the labour market – may offer findings that are 
even diametrically opposed to the conclusions of the classical model. One 
example of this occurs when there is a monopsony on the labour market, i.e. 
where there is just one or a few enterprises on the demand side of the market, 
as a dominant factor. The monopsony model can be used even on the basis of 
more realistic assumptions; for instance, in all cases where changing jobs is too 
costly, or where there is only one employer within reasonable reach for 
employees, and so where employers have a stronger bargaining position than 
employees (Manning, 2003).   
In the case of a monopsonistic labour market, if there is no statutory 
minimum wage, the level of employment (E0) is determined by the intersection 
of the curve of the marginal cost of labour (MC) and that of demand (D) (Figure 
4). 4  By virtue of its dominant position, the enterprise can pay the lowest 
possible wage for which it still finds sufficient labour, instead of a wage that 
corresponds to the marginal revenue generated by an employee’s work. The 
equilibrium wage is determined by the supply of labour instead of by the 
marginal cost: in the figure this will be the wage level W0 on the labour supply 
                                                 
4 The marginal cost of labour is the cost of hiring one more employee. Demand for labour can 
be derived from the marginal revenue – this is the income of the enterprise from the output of 
one additional employee. For the enterprise, it is worth hiring employees so long as the 
marginal revenue is larger than the marginal cost. 
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curve (S) at point E0. Clearly, in this case both the employment level and the 
wage level are lower than in the case of perfect competition.  
If, under such circumstances, the government introduces a statutory 
minimum wage, it forces the employer in a stronger bargaining position to 
accept the increased wage level, and can thus achieve an increase in 
employment along the supply curve. The new wage (Wm) will entail an 
employment level S(Wm). If the minimum wage is fixed at the wage level 
prevailing in a competitive market (W1), the level of employment will also 
correspond to that prevailing in the competitive market (E1). Accordingly, the 
level of employment can be increased up to this point by setting a minimum 
wage that is higher than the original wage level. However, a minimum wage set 
higher than level W1, will result in a level of employment below that prevailing 
in a competitive market, and a very high minimum wage level may even reduce 
employment to below the original level of employment. 
Figure 4: The effect of a minimum wage increase in the monopsony model  
 
Source: Brown et al. (1982). 
 
A further problem is that, in contrast to another assumption of the 
classical model, labour is not homogeneous: people differ in age, by region, etc., 
and consequently there is not one labour supply curve but many. 
Consequently, if the state sets the minimum wage on the basis of some national 
average, in some markets – where it is higher than the competitive market level 
– it may trigger a significant drop in employment, while in other sectors it may 
not achieve the maximum possible increase in employment.  
As we have seen, theories alone do not give us the required guidance 
concerning the effects of a minimum wage on employment; therefore we must 
resort to findings of empirical research. Quite a number of authors have been 
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dealing with this area, and perhaps the most widely known analysis is that 
produced by David Card and Alan Krueger (1994), along with other related 
studies. This will be discussed in more detail in the section summarizing 
empirical research programmes, but it should be noted here that not even the 
international findings of empirical research can close the theoretical debates 
definitively, because examples can be found of negative, neutral and positive 
impacts on employment. That is why we need empirical research using data on 
the Hungarian economy.  
3.3. Additional alternative approaches to the impacts of the minimum 
wage  
According to efficiency wage models, wage is not only a function of 
productivity: it is also used to stimulate increased effort and to build loyalty 
among employees. For this reason, employers may offer wages higher than the 
equilibrium to maximize productivity and consequently minimize labour costs. 
One reason for higher efficiency wages may be that the enterprise is growing, 
which makes it more difficult to control employees. According to efficiency 
wage theories, where productivity is determined by wages an increase in the 
minimum wage may also result in increased employment.5  
Another approach argues that enterprises finance training at the 
workplace from the amount saved by paying less than would be justified by the 
productivity of the worker, and therefore an increase in the minimum wage has 
a negative impact on training. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) apply a 
monopsony model to estimate impacts on training. They assume that there is a 
certain experience built up at the workplace that results in growing 
productivity, which generates rent for the company. According to their model, 
some employees can be trained only if the employer contributes to the costs, 
while others can afford to pay for their own training. If the minimum wage is 
higher than the productivity of the trained employee, it is worth training the 
employee.6 An increase in the minimum wage reduces the rent retained by the 
employer; however, it can be partly or fully recovered through training, by 
increasing the employee’s productivity. Of course, the minimum wage must not 
be so high as to prevent any kind of employment at all. On the other hand, in 
the case of employees who could finance the costs of their own training by 
accepting pay below the minimum wage, an increase in the minimum wage has 
a negative impact and reduces their training. The complex impact can be 
established only through empirical research. 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) used a database from the US containing 
information on the employment and training of young people (National 
                                                 
5 For a more detailed discussion of the efficiency wage theories, see Kertesi and Köllő (2003). 
6 If a skilled and an unskilled employee both have to be paid the minimum wage (because the 
productivity of the skilled employee is also below the minimum wage level, though it is 
higher than that of the untrained one), it is more worthwhile for the company to employ the 
skilled worker. 
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Longitudinal Survey of Youth, NLSY) to study the likelihood of diminishing 
training at the workplace among individuals affected by an increase in the 
minimum wage. The NLSY database contained data on young people aged 
between 14 and 21 years in 1979. The authors used the 1987–92 period within 
this panel to work out their estimates. They found that the probability of 
training was no lower among those working for the minimum wage than 
among other employees. The authors note that this model does not necessarily 
contradict the classical theory, so long as the training provided by the company 
is quite specific, and focuses on the skills required for the given job instead of 
developing general skills. This, however, is not supported by statistics, 
according to which 63% of training programmes in the USA are of a general 
nature, or are predominantly general (14%). In assessing the above findings it 
should also be taken into account that the authors could study only the formal 
training programmes, while informal training is much more extensive in low-
paid jobs.  
An increase in the minimum wage may also affect the size of the formal 
and the informal (grey or black) sectors. According to traditional arguments, an 
increase in the minimum wage might drive certain activities into the grey or 
black sector for two reasons: employees are paid lower wages and the greater 
risks occasioned by an increase in the minimum wage can be mitigated by 
moving into the grey or black sectors. The reason for this is as follows: if one of 
the features of the informal sector is self-employment and performance-based 
pay then, though the wages may be the same or even higher than in the formal 
sector, the employee is paid on the basis of his performance, and so the 
employer faces a smaller risk of not receiving adequate performance for the 
wages paid. Consequently, from the point of view of the employer, there is a 
lower risk of inadequate performance on the part of the employee than exists in 
the formal sector. Nevertheless, if the higher minimum wage facilitates 
migration from rural to urban areas, the increase in the supply of poorly 
qualified labour might also trigger an expansion of the informal sector. 
4. The findings of empirical research in international literature  
Empirical research has generated ample literature on our subject, and 
different studies have produced at times contradictory findings. However, two 
relatively stable conclusions do seem to crystallize from this highly versatile 
empirical literature. One is that negative impacts on employment affect 
primarily the young generation (Brown et al., 1982; Dolado et al., 1996). The 
other important conclusion is that the effects of the minimum wage are 
significantly influenced by the economic environment, for example by the ratio 
of the minimum wage to the average wage, the number of employees 
concerned, and whether there is a period of economic upturn or a slump. The 
findings of different empirical research projects vary widely in terms of the 
direction in which the minimum wage impacts on employment, and the 
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emphasis of research has increasingly shifted to the question of whether the 
minimum wage has any material impact on employment at all. 
This subsection discusses the results of empirical research projects and 
highlights differences between the applied methodologies. 
4.1. A minimum wage increase may have a positive or a neutral impact  
The 1990s saw a large number of empirical studies, which found weak – neutral 
or even positive – correlations between a minimum wage and employment. A 
study published by Katz and Krueger (1992) was perhaps the first of these. It 
explored the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on the fast-food market 
of the state of Texas using a multivariate (ordinary least squares OLS) method. The 
authors refuted the hypothesis of a negative effect on employment. The difference-
in-differences (DiD)7 method (which has come to be much more widely used in 
programme evaluation) was applied by Card and Krueger (1994) in their 
empirical analysis, which has attracted a lot of attention since its publication. 
The authors studied the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on 
employment and wage levels in fast-food restaurants in New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania; contrary to the classical hypothesis, they too found a positive 
impact on employment. The minimum wage was increased in New Jersey in 
April 1992 from US$ 4.25 to US$ 5.05, while it remained unchanged in the 
neighbouring Pennsylvania. By comparing the two states, the authors found no 
definite negative relationship between the rise in the minimum wage and 
employment. At the time this finding was something of a breakthrough. 
For their study Card and Krueger (1994) chose fast-food restaurants – 
which were expected to be severely affected – because they had large numbers 
of low-paid workers and because this sector had been found to be highly 
responsive to questionnaire surveys. The authors sent their questionnaires to 
410 fast-food restaurants before and after the rise in the minimum wage. In both 
periods the response rate was higher than 90%. The control groups comprised 
fast-food restaurants that also operated in New Jersey but that paid higher 
wages to their employees, who consequently were not affected by the increase 
(control group A), and fast-food restaurants operating in Pennsylvania (control 
group B). 
Their estimates, based on the difference-in-differences (DiD) method, 
showed that in New Jersey the average initial wage of the group affected by the 
increase in the minimum wage grew by 10% and, contrary to expectations, 
employment increased; while in Pennsylvania – where the minimum wage 
remained unchanged – employment decreased. The authors found a similar 
                                                 
7 The essence of the DiD – difference-in-differences – estimate is to compare the change 
observed in the group affected by the wage increase to change observed in a control group 
(with change in headcount or working hours). For an estimate to be valid, the group affected 
and the group not affected by the rise in the minimum wage must be essentially similar, i.e. 
the only difference between them should be whether the minimum wage was or was not 
increased. 
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result when they looked at the restaurants in New Jersey that were paying high 
wages (control group A): employment increased in the low-income sector 
affected by the rise in the minimum wage, whereas it declined in the control 
group. It should be noted that the decline in the control groups was, to a large 
extent, a consequence of the general economic downturn.  
Accordingly, in this case the empirical findings totally contradict the 
hypothesis based on the classical theory, according to which a rise in the 
minimum wage should reduce employment.  
One possible explanation may be that the negative impact of the 
minimum wage was offset by the growth in demand for fast-food restaurants (a 
positive demand shock). The authors explored this possibility as well, and they 
found that the market conditions were relatively constant within the regions 
covered by the study, making it fairly unlikely that the results had been caused 
by unexpected demand shocks. Another possible explanation was that 
restaurants cut non-cash benefits in response to the increase in the minimum 
wage. In the majority of cases, non-cash benefits mean discounted or free meals. 
Quite interestingly, however, non-cash benefits (the proportions of free meals) 
were increased, rather than cut in New Jersey. A third possibility was that the 
rise in the minimum wage would result in higher consumer prices. During the 
period under review, prices increased 3.2% faster in New Jersey than in 
Pennsylvania (that is control group B); however, no such difference was found 
between the low and high-income restaurants in New Jersey (i.e. in a 
comparison with control group A). The explanation for this is probably that 
restaurants in New Jersey were competing on the same geographical market, 
and this precluded any major difference between the prices. On the whole, the 
case study of Card and Krueger (1994) highlights the positive effect an increase 
in the minimum wage can have on employment, and shows that the main result 
of the wage increase was an increase in consumer prices. 
Responding to criticism of the above study (most of which related to 
possible distortions resulting from telephone responses) Card and Krueger 
(1998) recalculated their results using a database supplied by the statistics 
office. This database is generated from official reports submitted by employers 
to the local labour office, and is the most reliable of the available data sources. 
The authors used a representative sample from this database covering the years 
1992 and 1993. Their findings are very similar to those outlined above: in New 
Jersey employment grew at least as fast as in Pennsylvania during the period 
under review. By assessing a variety of model specifications (in essence, all the 
applied models use DiD methods, with various explanatory variables reviewing 
different groups of restaurants and measuring the change in employment in 
terms of persons or percentages) they came to the conclusion that the rise in the 
minimum wage probably had zero or only a modest positive impact on 
employment in the fast-food restaurant sector of New Jersey. 
Machin and Manning (1997) surveyed four European countries, and they 
also found that increasing minimum wages had no negative impacts on 
employment. Their paper analysed the change in employment as a whole in a 
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breakdown by geographical units, with a special focus on low-income regions. 
The authors compared the period between the early 60s and the mid-80s to the 
period between the mid-80s and the mid-90s. According to their empirical 
findings, employment in low-income regions increased at a higher rate even 
during periods of substantial rises in the minimum wage. 
Dolado et al. (1996) studied the impacts of the minimum wage by 
splitting the 80s into two periods. During the first half of the decade the 
minimum wage increased in relation to average earnings, while in the second 
half no significant rise was observed in the minimum wage. According to their 
empirical findings, the rise in the minimum wage had a negative impact on 
employment: during the first half of the 80s the minimum wage was one of the 
causes of high unemployment. During the second half of the decade, both the 
minimum wage and the unemployment rate declined somewhat. In evaluating 
the results, however, the economic conditions must also be taken into account. 
The period between 1981 and 1985 was one of recession, while the second half 
of the same decade was a boom period, a further reflection of which may have 
been visible in the changes in unemployment. To control for this factor, the 
period between 1967 and 1992 – which saw three substantial rises in the 
minimum wage – was also studied. The authors also looked at the group of 
low-income people separately, confirming the hypothesis that a rise in the 
minimum wage has the greatest impact where wages are lowest. In the period 
between 1967 and 1985 – when minimum wages increased quite substantially – 
employment also increased, but no such relationship could be identified during 
the period between 1985 and 1990. Accordingly, over a longer period of time no 
close negative relationship could be found between a rise in the minimum wage 
and changes in employment. 
Dolado et al. (1996) studied the impact of the minimum wage on 
employment in two other European countries (Spain and the United Kingdom) 
using a time-series estimate based on aggregated data, from which the authors 
drew two important conclusions. Since between 1965 and 1995 the proportion 
of the minimum wage relative to the average wage did not change much in 
these two countries, it cannot be maintained that the growth in unemployment 
was caused by a rise in the minimum wage. Furthermore, the minimum wage 
was found to have a wide variety of impacts on employment. In some cases the 
minimum wage reduced employment (particularly among young people); in 
other groups it increased employment. The authors therefore concluded that it 
would not be easy to find strong evidence to support the assumption that a 
minimum wage reduces employment. 
One of the analyses that cast doubt on the findings of the Card and 
Krueger (1994) study was published in an article written by Neumark and 
Wascher (1995), who studied the same case using the same method but a 
different database from the one used by Card and Krueger (1994). Neumark 
and Wascher argued that the database compiled for the original study was of 
inferior quality and that was the reason why the authors had found a positive 
impact on employment. Based on the data, which they interrogated using a 
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different method, they found significant negative impacts of the minimum 
wage on employment (instead of the 0.93 wage flexibility indicator estimated 
by Card and Krueger, they found a –0.24 wage flexibility).  
Michl (1999) made an attempt to reconcile the two studies that had led to 
such contrasting findings, showing that both calculations had yielded correct 
results and the contrast between their findings was a result of their different 
definition of employment. Card and Krueger (1994) had used the number of 
employees (i.e. full-time job equivalent), while Neumark and Wascher (1995) 
had used the number of completed working hours as a dependent variable. 
Michl (1999) shows that it is possible to find a situation in which the number of 
employees does not diminish following an increase in the minimum wage, but 
rather the weekly number of working hours per employee – and thus the total 
number of working hours – is reduced. According to Michl, whether this 
should be regarded as a drop in employment depends on whether the question 
is asked from a theoretical or an economic-policy perspective. In theory, 
employment is indeed reduced; however, in practice, the same number of 
employees might work fewer hours than before, but probably for at least as 
much as they had earned before, which, on the whole, may result in growing 
social prosperity.  
4.2. A minimum wage increase may have a negative impact on 
employment  
Quite a number of empirical studies show findings indicative of negative 
impacts on employment, for one or another specific group of people (e.g. Bazen 
and Skourias, 1997 for young people), or for cases of significant rises in the 
minimum wage (e.g. Pereira, 1999; Rama, 2000). Two of these studies are 
discussed in detail below. 
The relationship between the minimum wage and employment has been 
the subject of particularly intense debate and extensive empirical research in 
France. The level of the minimum wage has been relatively stable, with no 
dramatic increases taking place. Some larger rises were introduced in 1968, 1973 
and 1981, of which the 10% increase of 1981 has been the most frequently 
studied. Bazen and Skourias (1997) focused on the younger generation, which 
had been expected to be most affected. During the period under review – 
between March 1980 and March 1984 – the proportion of young people among 
all employees dropped from 14.6% to 12.9%. The important question is to what 
extent this decline was caused by the steady rise in the minimum wage during 
the period. The authors’ main conclusion is that the 10% rise in the minimum 
wage did contribute to the drop in the proportion of young people within the 
total number of workers.  
Bazen and Skourias (1997) set up the following four categories: the sector 
least affected (by less than 3%), the sector little affected (by 3% to 8%), the 
vulnerable sector (by 8% to 15%) and the sector very seriously affected (by more 
than 15%) by the increased minimum wage. The following figure shows 
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percentages for the above sectors within the total number of employees during 
the period under review. 
Figure 5: Percentage of young people within the total number of employees  
 
Source: Bazen and Skourias (1997). 
Note: The percentages shown are average figures weighted for employment in the 
various sectors. 
 
The March–October breakdown is the basis for regression applied in the 
model (the 10% increase in the minimum wage took effect in June 1981). 
The basic specification of the model is as follows: 
tttt uETMWEY +∆+=∆ )log(βα  
tEY∆ : change in the proportion of young people employed (between 
March and October) 
tET )log(∆ : change in the total employment percentage (between March 
and October) 
tMW : proportion of employees affected by the increase in the minimum 
wage. 
To make their findings even more accurate, the authors also studied the 
annual difference in the changes occurring between March and October 1980 
and the same months in 1981, using the difference-in-differences method. In 
this case the model specification is as follows:   
ttatata vETMWEY +∆∆+∆=∆∆ )log(δγ   
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where a∆  means the annual changes. 
Table 2: The impact of the minimum wage on the employment of young people  
Result variable 
Coefficient of 
the MW 
variable 
t-statistics 
Change that took place in employment before the increase in the
minimum wage    
1. Percentage of change in employment between March and October 1981 0.051 2.17 
Difference-in-differences (DiD) method    
2. Percentage of change in employment between March and October 1980
and March and October 1981  –0.124 2.91 
3. Percentage of change in employment between March 1981 and March
1982 –0.040 2.46 
4. Percentage of change in employment between March 1980 and March
1984 –0.174 4.11 
Source: Bazen and Skourias (1997).  
 
Regression shows a definitely negative relationship between a minimum 
wage and the employment of young people. The results are presented in Table 
2, and special attention should be paid to the second row (regression according 
to the above model specification). The coefficient of variable MW (the 
proportion of those influenced by the minimum wage) is negative and 
significant, i.e. the larger the increase in the percentage of those affected by the 
minimum wage between 1980 and 1981, the smaller the growth in employment 
of young people in the given sector. The question is whether this relationship 
can be observed over a longer period of time. The authors also arrived at a 
similar result when they estimated the above regression for the period between 
1980 and 1984: again, the impact of the minimum wage was found to be 
negative and significant (row 4 in Table 2).  
The example of Portugal (Pereira, 1999) also confirms the above findings, 
i.e. that a rise in the minimum wage has a negative impact on employment 
among the youngest generation. A relatively unexpected and large-scale 
increase was introduced on 1 January 1987 in Portugal: employees in the 18–19 
age group were granted entitlement to the adult minimum wage by law, 
resulting in a 49.3% wage increase for this category of employees. Since the 
change was unexpected and quite big, its impacts on the wage level and on 
employment are easy to analyse. The author applied a method that was similar 
to the one used in the Card and Krueger (1994) study: comparing the wage and 
employment data for the age group affected by the rise in the minimum wage 
to the corresponding data for the 20–25 and the 30–35 control age groups. The 
model specification is as follows: 
ijtjtiijt XdY εγβα +++=∆  
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where ijtY∆ means the change in employment of the ith age group working for 
the jth employer before and after the increase, the X vector comprises company-
specific variables, and the value of the dummy variable d equals 1 in the case of 
the 18–19 age group affected by the minimum wage increase and 0 in the case of 
the control groups. The parameter of interest, the one to be estimated, is β . If 
this parameter significantly differs from zero, the increase in the minimum 
wage has an impact on employment; otherwise there is no such impact. The 
results show a definitely negative and significant impact, as presented in Table 
3. 
Table 3: Impact on the number of employees  
Age groups  
 
1986–87 1986–88 1986–89 1985/86– 
1988/89 
1985/86– 
1987–89 
18–19 and 20–25 age group  –0.087** –0.196** –0.223** –0.202** –0.173** 
  (0.020) (0.033) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) 
18–19 and 30–35 age group –0.025 –0.107** –0.010 –0.100 –0.087 
 (0.020) (0.033) (0.056) (0.062) (0.055) 
20–25 and 30–35 age group 0.063** 0.089** 0.212** 0.102 0.086 
 (0.023) (0.037) (0.059) (0.064) (0.057) 
Source: Pereira (1999). 
Note: The estimated variance of the parameter is presented between brackets – being 
the significant parameter values at 1%.  
 
Comparing the rate of employment in the 18–19 age group to that in the 
20–25 age group shows a definite decline (the coefficient is negative in each box 
in the top row of the table). In the case of the 30–35 age group (second row) the 
coefficients are negative in each case, though their absolute value is smaller. The 
results in the third row show a change in the employment of the two control 
groups: employment in the 20–25 age group increased at a higher rate than in 
the 30–35 age group in each of the periods under review. In this case, therefore, 
the results show a kind of substitution effect: the rate of employment in the 20–
25 age group increased at the expense of the employment of people in the 18–19 
age group. 
In summary, a few clear-cut trends may be discerned in the wide-
ranging empirical findings. Emphasis has shifted from assessment of negative 
impacts on employment to the question of whether there are any impacts at all. 
In the case of the increases in the minimum wage reviewed here, it is possible to 
identify negative impacts on the employment of people belonging to the 
youngest generation, but no negative impacts on employment in general. The 
studies described above are summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Studies exploring the impacts of a minimum wage on employment  
Study Rate of 
minimum 
wage increase  
Groups under 
review 
Method 
applied  
Impact 
identified 
Katz and 
Krueger (1992) 
9% increase 
(from $3.81 to 
$4.25) 
Employees of 
fast-food 
restaurants in 
Texas, USA 
OLS estimate 
based on wage 
gap 
Positive 
Card and 
Krueger (1994) 
18.8% increase 
(from $4.25 to 
$5.05) 
Employees of 
fast-food 
restaurants in 
New Jersey, 
USA 
Difference-in-
differences 
(DiD) method 
Significant 
positive (0.93 
flexibility) 
Card and 
Krueger (1998)* 
18.8% increase 
(from $4.25 to 
$5.05) 
Employees of 
fast-food 
restaurants in 
New Jersey, 
USA 
 DiD method Neutral or 
slightly positive 
Machin and 
Manning (1997) 
Repeated 
increases 
between 1960 
and 1990 
All employees 
in France, the 
Netherlands, 
Spain and 
England 
Regression to 
see relationship 
between change 
in employment 
and change in 
wage, on panel 
of regions 
Neutral 
(mixed); in 
Spain 
substitution 
from younger 
towards older 
generation 
Dolado et al. 
(1996) 
Repeated 
increases 
between 1960 
and 1990 
All employees 
in France, the 
Netherlands, 
Spain and 
England 
Regression 
between change 
in employment 
and Kaitz index 
Mixed, negative 
impact on 
employment of 
young people  
Neumark and 
Wascher (1995)* 
 
18.8% increase 
(from $4.25 to 
$5.05) 
Employees of 
fast-food 
restaurants in 
New Jersey, 
USA 
DiD method Significant 
negative 
(–0.24 
flexibility) 
Michl (1999)*+  
 
18.8% increase 
(from $4.25 to 
$5.05) 
Employees of 
fast-food 
restaurants in 
New Jersey, 
USA 
Theoretical 
model 
The impact 
depends on 
definition of 
employment  
Bazen and 
Skourias (1997) 
10% between 
1980 and 1984  
Young people, 
France  
DiD Significant 
negative  
(–0.17 
flexibility) 
Pereira (1999) 43.9% increase 
for employees 
18–19 age 
group, Portugal 
DiD  Significant 
negative 
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Study Rate of 
minimum 
wage increase  
Groups under 
review 
Method 
applied  
Impact 
identified 
aged 18–19 group, Portugal negative 
Kertesi and 
Köllő (2004) 
from HUF 
25,500 to HUF 
40,000 
SME sector, 
Hungary 
DiD 3SLS 
method 
Significant 
negative 
(–0.27– –0.32) 
Notes: The findings of the Kertesi and Köllő (2004) study are presented in Section 5. 
*Recalculation of Card and Krueger (1994) + Recalculation of Neumark and Wascher 
(1995). 
4.3. Impact of minimum wage on income inequalities  
One of the purposes of the minimum wage may be to improve the 
position of people living in poverty or those living close to the poverty line. In 
the case of a large part of the debates and the empirical impact assessments 
relating to the minimum wage, however, emphasis is shifted toward the 
impacts on employment, while impacts on redistribution are often disregarded. 
Though exploring the impacts on employment is very important, this alone is 
not sufficient to provide a satisfactory answer as to changes in the income 
positions of families. As was shown by Neumark and Wascher (1997), leaving 
aside the number of people who have lost their jobs following a rise in the 
minimum wage, the income levels of the families in which such individuals live 
should also be explored. For many minimum wage earners do not belong to the 
poorest groups in society, and the growth of the minimum wage does not in 
itself provide information on changes in the average incomes of poor families.  
The minimum wage does not play a definite role in reducing poverty or 
income inequalities, for the poorest families do not typically have any labour 
income at all. According to an OECD study (OECD, 1998) some 80% of those 
working for the minimum wage in the member states were people on a medium 
or high per capita income. Likewise in Hungary, instead of poor households, 
the majority of minimum wage earners live in households that fall within the 
middle third in terms of household income (see subsection 5.4). 
Finally, the employment impacts of a minimum wage increase are 
usually estimated with respect to the whole population, without providing 
direct estimates of the impacts on people earning the minimum wage, despite 
the fact that such an increase probably has rather different impacts on workers 
in different positions. This subsection discusses international empirical findings 
concerning income distribution. 
Neumark and Wascher (1997) studied this question in detail on the 
labour market of the United States of America. A review of a one or two-year 
period in the case of low-income families with active earners, both before and 
after an increase in the minimum wage, shows that such families have an 
increased chance of seeing their earnings grow above the poverty line. At the 
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same time, as a consequence of the negative impacts of the rise in the minimum 
wage, the number of wage earners may drop in certain families, thus increasing 
the likelihood of their becoming poor. On an aggregate level, these impacts 
more or less offset one another. From this, the authors conclude that the 
minimum wage is much more of a tool influencing income distribution among 
the poor, than it is a measure channelling income from the rich toward the poor. 
An assessment of the longer-term impacts shows, however, that the labour 
market adapts itself to an increase in the minimum wage in a variety of ways – 
by modifying the wage level, the number of employees and the number of 
working hours; by changing the composition of the workforce, etc. – as a result 
of which the impact of the rise in the minimum wage on income turns negative. 
Furthermore, the (negative) employment impacts of an increase in the 
minimum wage are focused on low wage earners, which also undermines the 
argument that a rise in the minimum wage improves the income position of this 
social group.  
Addison and Blackburn (1998) came to the opposite conclusion when 
they assessed data recorded in the US between 1983 and 1996. They found that, 
as opposed to what happened in the 80s, minimum wages did help alleviate 
poverty during the 90s, especially among young people who had dropped out 
of secondary education. The authors explained this in part by arguing that, in 
assessing the impact on income distribution, previous studies had often relied 
on assumptions – for the want of clear-cut theoretical conclusions – concerning 
the impact of the minimum wage on employment, for example by using job loss 
rates taken from other studies. Furthermore, the authors found that this positive 
impact during the period cannot be explained either by improvements in labour 
market prospects or by an increase in the ratio of people with higher 
qualifications within the total labour supply. The first of these arguments is 
countered by the fact that the period 1990–96 began with an economic 
downturn, and consequently labour market prospects were hardly promising. 
The second point is refuted by the authors’ empirical findings: the results of the 
OLS estimate based on state level (panel) data do not show any increase in the 
proportion of people with higher qualifications in the labour supply.  
Based on their assessment of long-term impacts, Neumark and Nizalova 
(2004) point out that a statutory minimum wage usually has a negative impact 
on the employment of the youngest generation on the labour market, and that 
this may have serious long-term implications as a consequence of less 
experience on the labour market and reduced willingness to work. They 
consider that people who take up employment in their younger years on a 
labour market with a higher minimum wage will be less likely to continue their 
studies, and since the high minimum wage results in longer periods and a 
higher frequency of unemployment, they will be more likely to get involved in 
illegal activities. The authors also note that a reverse relationship is likewise 
possible – young people forced out of the labour market may decide to continue 
with their studies. Neumark and Nizalova (2004) developed indicators to track 
over the past 30 years the amount of the state minimum wage (vis-à-vis the 
federal minimum wage) and the length of time over which it was payable to 
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people in the USA in the age group 16–29, estimating the impact on their 
employment (number of working hours completed) and their wages. The 
authors found that the wages of teenagers are increased and those of people in 
the 25–29 age group are reduced when there is a relatively high minimum 
wage. In states that had introduced high minimum wages, people in the 25–29 
age bracket earned 3% less. By contrast, the authors found no significant 
relationship between the minimum wage paid to young people and their 
employment levels.  
If the role played by trade unions is also taken into account, it is found 
that an increase in the minimum wage has opposite impacts on low-income 
employees, depending on whether or not they belong to trade unions. The 
results show that trade union members gain from increases in the minimum 
wage at the expense of non-members ((Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher, 
2000).  
By reviewing other means of redistribution, Neumark and Wascher 
(2000) found that a negative-tax support is much more effective in improving 
the income position of those living below the poverty line than a minimum 
wage. They found that an income-dependent tax credit/support (Earned Income 
Tax Credit, which in the US means a wage subsidy below a certain income level, 
and tax relief above it) results in improvement primarily by stimulating families 
without active earners. 
Based on their analysis of the British labour market, Manning and Dickens 
(2002) offer a new solution to the problem of missing data in relation to wages.8 
The authors show that earlier studies had been based on false assumptions, 
which led to a 50% overestimation of the numbers of those affected by the 
increase in the minimum wage. On the basis of simple assumptions, the authors 
arrived at a number of new conclusions. The relationship between low wage-
income and poverty seems to have grown stronger over recent years, so 
minimum wages might perhaps play an increased role in reducing poverty. At 
the same time, as the authors point out, the most one can say on the basis of the 
data is that the minimum wage has an uncertain impact on income distribution. 
By reviewing differences between the wages of men and women, they found 
that the introduction of a minimum wage reduced the inequality between the 
average earnings of men and women by some 0.3–0.4%. 
From their assessment of Latin-American countries Maloney and 
Mendez (2003) concluded that an increase in the minimum wage has a 
substantial impact even on people working for much more than the minimum 
wage, and that this impact is more substantial than was found by Neumark and 
Wascher (1997) in the United States of America, i.e. an increase in the minimum 
wage has a more substantial impact in these countries on the whole of the 
income distribution regime. The authors explain this by the much higher degree 
of labour market inflexibility in Latin America. 
                                                 
8 In the United Kingdom the minimum wage applies to hourly rates. However, no precise data 
on hourly rates are available for some 40% of employees. 
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Saget (2001) reviewed the impact of minimum wages on poverty in 
developing countries, relying on the ILO database. In the case of groups defined 
on the basis of a variety of poverty lines (e.g. the national poverty line or the 
number of those living on 1 or 2 dollars a day), the author found that a 
minimum wage significantly reduces the number of people living below the 
poverty line, even if the effect of the average wage increase is eliminated. This 
conclusion corresponds to those of studies by the OECD (1997, 1998), which 
found that a high minimum wage is usually accompanied by a lower poverty 
rate – and vice versa. This relationship was explained by the OECD on the 
principle that this macro-level relationship shows the general state of the 
society – i.e. a lower level of inequality is rooted in institutional agreements – 
and does not necessarily mean that an increase in the minimum wage would 
reduce poverty. 
4.4. Other impacts of an increase in the minimum wage 9  
On the subject of the effects of increases in the minimum wage on 
employment, it is often argued that employers try to offset the cost-increasing 
impacts of a rise in the minimum wage by lowering the standards of labour 
safety and by cutting training expenditure (Simon, 2003).  
In the United States of America, 25% of all benefits are extra-wage 
benefits, of which 15%points are voluntary, i.e. companies can, in theory, 
implement increases in the minimum wage at the expense of such benefits. This 
option, however, is limited by a variety of factors. The US federal tax law 
guarantees tax exemption for certain types of extra-wage benefits (e.g. health 
insurance) and tax relief for others (pension contributions), but only if the levels 
of benefit are not set by the employer on an individual basis. Accordingly, it is 
not possible to set the amounts of the extra-wage benefits freely, for each 
individual employee, and it is not likely that enterprises would adjust the 
general system of benefits to the relatively small percentage of employees 
working for the minimum wage (i.e. adjusting downwards), thereby damaging 
the standing of groups of employees earning higher wages (Simon, 2003).   
Labour safety is, to a significant degree, a public good within the 
enterprise, shared by the various employee groups (employees who have 
become ‘too’ expensive as a result of a minimum wage increase cannot be 
excluded from it). The rest of the extra-wage benefits, such as paid holiday 
entitlement and sickness benefit, can be provided in a highly flexible way, 
adjusted to the individual employee. 
A look back over 25 years in the USA reveals a decline in extra-wage 
benefits in both the marginal and the core groups of employees. This is an 
indication of the existence of a trend – which is independent of the 
development of minimum wages – of declining generosity by employers in this 
                                                 
9 We extend our thanks to László Szabó for his valuable contribution to this section. 
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field. Simon (2003) found no negative relationship in his analysis over time 
between the minimum wage and the extra-wage benefits. 
Based on a review of the impacts of a minimum wage on the informal 
and the formal sectors, the study by Maloney and Mendez (2003) concludes that 
a minimum wage may have a ‘lighthouse’ effect on wages in the informal 
sector, i.e. that the minimum wage is a reference point for the whole of the 
economy. Moreover, the minimum wage has a stronger impact on wages in the 
informal sector than in the formal. Thus the traditional theory – by which 
flexible wages are the feature of the informal sector that allow it to absorb 
labour forced out of the formal sector by inflexible wages – does not hold water. 
As well as being more efficient than the formal sector, the informal sector can 
also bypass regulations and costs. The findings of regression analyses show that 
a rise in the minimum wage has a negative impact on the employment of 
people working in the informal sector as well.   
5. The Hungarian experience  
A very substantial rise in the minimum wage was introduced in 
Hungary in 2001–02. The government then in office practically doubled the 
minimum wage in a two-year period, first increasing the monthly wage on 1 
January 2001 from HUF 25,000 to HUF 40,000, and then in January 2002 
increasing it further to HUF 50,000. As a consequence of this measure, the 
minimum wage/average wage ratio (Kaitz index) rose dramatically – to 43% in 
2002 – though it still remained below the OECD average (Kertesi and Köllő, 
2005). The growth in the minimum wage and its ratio to the average wage is 
shown in Figure 6.  
Figure 6: Growth in the amount and proportion of the minimum wage in comparison to 
the average wage 1992–2003 (HUF, %) 
 
Source: Kézdi et al. (2004). 
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The consequences of this drastic labour market measure have been 
reviewed in numerous studies, and most analyses of the domestic effects of the 
minimum wage are related to it. 
The first analyses based on descriptive statistics assessed the group(s) of 
employees whose wages were in need of adjustment. According to the 
calculations of Popper (2002), the first increase directly affected about a quarter 
of the people working in the private sector, while the second increase affected a 
third of them. The wage increase prescribed by law applied to 47–59% of people 
working in the textile and the leather industries. According to Palócz and Tóth 
(2003) the statutory minimum wage prompted wage increases primarily in the 
service industry and in businesses employing small numbers of people. 
On the basis of their review of capital and labour expenditure between 
1992 and 1999 at enterprises with more than 300 employees, Kertesi and Köllő 
(2002) predicted significant drops in employment as a consequence of the 
increases in the minimum wage, for they would result in growing costs 
primarily in labour-intensive sectors and those enterprises employing people 
with low qualifications. It is in this very group of employees that capital can 
best take the place of labour (Kertesi and Köllő, 2002), and consequently factor 
substitution and a reduction in employment was more likely to be the outcome 
of a wage increase that affected the bottom of the wage scale, than price rises in 
a competitive market.  
The ex-post impact assessments of the increase in the minimum wage 
based on micro-level data focused on the impacts on employment and the 
budget. The findings of such assessments are described in the following two 
subsections. The third subsection explores the impacts of the increases in 2001 
and 2002 on the distribution of incomes: whether they improved the situation of 
the poor or not.  
5.1. Impacts of the rise in the minimum wage on employment in Hungary  
A paper produced by Kertesi and Köllő (2004) may perhaps be the most 
widely known analysis of the impact on employment. The authors reviewed 
only the impact of the wave of minimum-wage increases in 2001, primarily in 
the sector of small enterprises, assessing the chances of employees losing their 
jobs and of unemployed people finding employment. The key conclusion 
drawn by the authors in the paper is that the increase in the minimum wage 
resulted in a substantial reduction in employment opportunities in the small 
enterprise sector.  
The authors argue that the employment shock was caused not by the 
increase in the minimum wage itself, but rather was triggered by its ripple 
effect on the average wage: not only did employers raise the pay of people who 
used to earn less than the new minimum wage, but they also increased the 
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wages of people who had been earning more than the minimum wage, in order 
to maintain wage differentials.  
Accordingly, the extent of the wage shock was measured by the authors 
using the following formula for the wage-gap, instead of the indicator – the 
ratio of employees earning less than the minimum wage (F) – more usually 
applied in technical literature:10  
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where F is the percentage of people who used to earn less than the new 
minimum wage, Fw  is their average wage before the increase, Hw  the average 
wage of the rest of the employees, and 
*w  is the new minimum wage. The wage 
shock was calculated by the authors for regions that were assigned to different 
groups according to their standing. The regions were grouped together 
according to the local unemployment rates; the local unemployment rates are 
lowest in the first quartile and are highest in the fourth quartile. 
Figure 7: Average rate of the wage shock (ω) among people who have completed primary 
school, by group of regions, % 
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Source: Kertesi and Köllő (2004), p. 300. 
 
Figure 7 shows that the wage shock was greatest among young people, 
unskilled people, and those living in regions with high rates of unemployment. 
For example, in the group of people aged below 24 years, with poor education 
and living in the most disadvantaged regions (4th quartile) the average wage 
                                                 
10 The authors’ explanation is that this formula provides the ‘wage-gap’ that has to be filled by 
employers on the day the rise in the minimum wage takes effect. The indicator ω presented 
here is used instead of the more frequently applied F – that is, the proportion of people 
earning less than the minimum wage – because ω reflects information resulting from the wage 
level before the rise in the minimum wage. 
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increased by 16.7% after the increase in the minimum wage, while the average 
wage of people with further education degrees increased by only 1%. 
The aggregated data show that, though there is no decrease in 
employment in absolute terms, the rise in the minimum wage broke the earlier 
trend of increasing employment (Figure 8). 
Figure 8: Trends in employment between 1998 and 2002, the impacts of the rise in the 
minimum wage  
 
Source: Kertesi and Köllő (2004). 
Note: Seasonally adjusted monthly levels, in millions of persons, without agriculture 
and the public sector, CSO Labour Survey, Hungarian National Bank adjustment. 
 
A similar interpretation is provided by Kézdi et al. (2004): they hold that 
the expected significant negative employment impacts of the rise did not 
materialize and no significant drop occurred, apart from seasonal impacts on 
employment.  
An econometric analysis of micro-data in the small enterprise sector, 
however, showed a highly negative impact on employment there. Kertesi and 
Köllő (2004) estimated the impact on employment using the following method. 
Since the number of employees and the wage level influence one another, the 
first step was to assess these using independent factors. For this reason, as a 
first step they estimated the trend in the wage level on the basis of the afore-
mentioned wage shock, the region’s unemployment situation, and the profile of 
the enterprise during the earlier period. The significance of this lies in the fact 
that these explanatory variables are independent of the trends in headcount, 
and consequently their use does not distort the results. The wage trend that was 
estimated in this independent way could then be used to estimate the change in 
employment. The following model was estimated in a formalized way using the 
3SLS method: 
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where )ln(w∆  is the change in labour cost in real terms, ω  the wage-gap 
defined earlier, jU  the region quartile dummies, L, q, and w are headcount, 
output and real average wage at the company; )ln(q∆  is the change in the sales 
revenue in real terms; (K/L)0 is the capital/labour ratio in the base period; 0π  is 
the profit of the base period; X contains industry and region dummies.   
The estimated flexibility of the labour cost with respect to the wage shock 
varies between 0.65 and 0.77, depending on the regional unemployment levels. 
The labour cost flexibility of employment is –0.41. Accordingly, the indicator 
that is the product of the multiplication of these flexibility figures, i.e. the drop 
in headcount caused by the wage increase, varies between –0.32 and –0.27: in 
other words, a 1% wage increase resulted in a 0.27–0.32% drop in the number of 
employees, with regions of higher unemployment being hit harder.  
According to Kertesi and Köllő (2004), as a consequence of the rise in the 
minimum wage employment dropped by at least 3.5% between 2000 and 2001 in 
the group of small enterprises with 5–20 employees, and the impact was stronger 
in regions that had been in a worse position before the change. The authors 
reviewed the likelihood of people losing their jobs as a result of the rise in the 
minimum wage, and found that people on the minimum wage were twice as likely 
to lose their jobs as those with slightly higher pay, and that, in 2001 and then again 
in 2002, the chances of the low-earning unemployed finding jobs decreased 
substantially. 
According to the model calculations of Halpern et al. (2004) – who also 
took macro-level interactions (which are discussed in the next subsection) into 
account – as a consequence of the rises in the minimum wage introduced in 
2001 and 2002, employment dropped by 1.3–2.3 percentage points more than 
would have been the case if the minimum wage had been raised by only the 
rate of inflation. This decline affected only unskilled people, and the loss 
calculated for this group was as high as 2–4 percentage points. The first increase 
in the minimum wage did not result in any material increase in government 
revenues, whereas expenditure did increase. 
According to Köllő (2001), the model underlying the calculations 
identifies three different types of employee (unskilled, young skilled and older 
skilled). The level of employment is determined by different factors in the cases 
of skilled and unskilled people. The equilibrium employment level is 
determined on the market of unskilled labour by demand and the minimum 
wage, while, on the market of skilled labour, it is determined by demand and 
the inflexible supply. As a result of an increase in the minimum wage, the 
employment of unskilled labour declines: the higher the minimum wage, the 
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less worthwhile it is for the employer to employ unskilled people. The higher 
the proportion of ‘grey’ enterprises, the more substantial is the fall. This is 
explained by the fact that, for grey enterprises, a rise in the minimum wage 
results not only in higher wage costs, but also in increased average tax burdens. 
The model assumes that unskilled and skilled labour complement one another, 
while younger and older skilled labour substitute one other. 
Our own calculations based on aggregated data originating from PIT 
returns submitted to the Tax and Financial Control Administration (APEH) also 
reveal a drop in employment. In 2000 a total of 3.1 million people reported an 
annual labour income equalling at least the minimum wage, while in 2001 and 
2002 the corresponding figures were 2.9 million (7% down) and 2.8 million (11 
% down).  
The aggregated data also show that employers did not necessarily 
increase the pay of people earning less than the new minimum wage to the new 
minimum amount. In 2000 a total of 637,000 people reported annual labour 
income below the amount of the 2001 minimum wage; of these, 175,000 earned 
the 2000 minimum wage. In 2001 however, only 230,000 people were paid the 
annual amount of the new minimum wage, and at the same time the number of 
people earning more than the 2001 minimum wage grew by only 200,000. A 
comparison of the 2000 data against the 2002 minimum wage reveals a similar 
picture (Tables 5.a and 5.b). The conclusion is that, while the total number of 
people who filed tax returns for at least the amount of the annual minimum 
wage declined, the proportion of those earning the amount of the minimum 
wage increased, i.e. the flexibility of the labour market probably diminished. 
Table 5/a: Number of people reporting income equalling the current minimum 
wage, falling between the previous and the new (2001) minimum wage, 
and those reporting income above the new minimum wage, based on the 
aggregated data of PIT returns  
 2000 2001
number of people earning about the minimum
wage 175 512 226 485
number of people earning between the 2000 and
the 2001 minimum wage 462 277 
number of people earning more than the 2001
minimum wage  2 468 112 2 667 045
Total 3 105 901 2 893 530
Notes: i) Only those reporting annual labour income in excess of the minimum wage were taken 
into account; ii) minimum wage in 2000: HUF 306,000 p.a.; in 2001: HUF 480,000 p.a.; iii) the 
number of those earning between the 2000 minimum wage and the 2001 minimum wage is 
based on the amount of the 2001 minimum wage converted into the 2000 value; iv) in 
determining the number of people earning more than the 2001 minimum wage in the figure for 
2000, the 2001 minimum wage at its 2000 value was taken into account.  
32 
Table 5/b: Number of people reporting income equalling the current minimum 
wage, falling between the previous and the new (2002) minimum wage, 
and those reporting income above the new minimum wage, based on the 
aggregated data of PIT returns 
 2000 2001 2002
number of people earning about the
minimum wage 175 512 226 485 223 261
number of people earning between the
current and the 2002 minimum wage 700 170 129 488 
number of people earning more than the
2002 minimum wage  2 230 219 2 537 557 2 551 221
Total 3 105 901 2 893 530 2 774 482
Notes: i) Only those reporting annual labour income in excess of the minimum wage were taken 
into account; ii) minimum wage in 2000: HUF 306,000 p.a.; in 2001: HUF 480,000 p.a.; in 2002: 
HUF 600,000 p.a.; iii) the number of those earning between the current minimum wage and the 
2002 minimum wage is based on the amount of the 2002 minimum wage discounted to the year 
concerned; iv) in providing the number of people earning more than the 2002 minimum wage 
the discounted values were again taken into account. 
 
Kertesi and Köllő (2005) highlighted the fact that in Hungary the 
proportion of people earning about the minimum wage is very large compared 
to other OECD member states. As a consequence of the 2001 rise in the 
minimum wage, the number of people earning amounts of between 95% and 
105% of the minimum wage rose from the previous 5% – which equalled the 
OECD average – to 10%, and then 15.4% in the wake of the 2002 increase, which 
was a very high figure among the OECD member states. Our calculations show 
that, though this percentage has declined, in May 2004 it was still above 11%, 
reducing the adaptability of the labour market. Kézdi et al. (2004) noted, as a 
positive feature, that inequalities were substantially reduced by such an 
increase in the proportion of people earning the minimum wage because the 
average income of the poorest tenth of wage earners increased from 46% to 53% 
of the median income. It should be noted here, however, that this comment 
applies only to people who earned some wage after the rises in the minimum 
wage, and thus most of the people in the poorest groups of the population were 
not affected by the change at all. 
5.2. Budgetary impacts of the minimum wage increase  
Halpern et al. (2004) studied the impacts of the 2001 and 2002 rises in the 
minimum wage in a static general equilibrium model calibrated to 2001 data. 
One advantage of the model is that it is suitable for measuring the impacts on 
budgetary revenue and expenditure simultaneously, and at the same time it 
partly measures the impact of the grey economy as well. In this model the grey 
economy only appears on the labour market because some businesses report 
their employees to be earning just the minimum wage (on which they pay taxes 
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and contributions) and then supplement the employees’ income by paying 
them in cash, unofficially. The key conclusion drawn from this model is that, 
setting aside certain realistic assumptions concerning the operation of the 
economy, raising the minimum wage reduces (or impedes the growth of) 
employment and increases the budget deficit.  
According to the calculations, government revenue can increase only if 
the proportion of the grey economy does not change as a consequence of the 
rise in the minimum wage. Growth originates from PIT and contribution 
revenues: a higher minimum wage increases the contributions paid by 
unskilled workers and people reported as earners of the minimum wage. This is 
partly offset by the following two effects: a drop in employment among 
unskilled people and a reduction in the pay of skilled employees. This latter is 
the result of an indirect effect. As a consequence of the increased wages of 
unskilled employees, production grows more expensive and prices go up. 
Higher prices produce a fall in demand, which leads to reduced demand for 
labour. In this way, therefore, the demand for skilled labour falls, and the 
falling demand causes the wages of skilled workers to shrink. The higher the 
proportion of grey employers the larger the increase in the government’s 
revenue will be; at the same time, though, the wage elasticity of demand for 
labour diminishes. Consumption falls as a result of the price increase, and thus 
the revenue from consumption taxes remains largely unchanged. As higher 
contributions eat into the profits of businesses, they simply counter this by 
slightly increasing the proportion of grey employment.11 As a consequence of 
this potential reaction, the government’s revenue does not increase. 
The model manages government expenditure by fixing the expenditure 
in real terms, and thus its nominal value can change only as a consequence of 
price changes. Most businesses build wage-cost increases into their prices, so 
consumer prices go up in the majority of economic sectors. Expenditure, 
however, grows at a slower rate than the average price increase, for the 
government purchases primarily services (where the proportion of skilled 
labour is high and so producer prices are not increased so much by rises in the 
minimum wage). Expenditure grows faster if the proportion of the grey 
economy is large, because in this case the tax-increasing effect of the minimum 
wage is higher and prices grow faster.   
The budget deficit diminishes as a combined result of the above opposite 
impacts only if the proportion of grey employers is fixed or very low (not more 
than 10%) or very high (at least 60%; for details see Tables F.2–3 in the 
Appendix). The authors did not review the factors that these limits are sensitive 
to. An ever more important conclusion is that if, in response to an increase in 
                                                 
11 The profit rate is not substantially reduced by the increase in the minimum wage because the 
majority of businesses can incorporate wage costs in their prices. This varies by sector: it is 
typical of enterprises employing unskilled labour, for they face no import competition; 
however, light industry is an important exception to this. Reduction in the profit rate can also 
be offset by a small increase in the proportion of grey employers. 
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the minimum wage, some businesses start paying ‘grey wages’, contribution 
revenues will not increase and the balance of the budget will deteriorate. 
The model includes a number of initial assumptions, the application of 
which may be justified (to make calculations possible or owing to the 
limitations of the data sources) though they may also distort the results of the 
study. One such assumption is that the supply of skilled labour is fixed. If the 
skilled labour supply is flexible (even in the short term), employment will 
decline more and the wages of skilled employees will decline less. This may 
lead to a further reduction in employment due to the growth of prices and the 
reduced demand on the market. 
Beyond the labour market, the grey economy vanishes, and grey profit 
and grey income are lost from the model in the sense that these cannot be 
‘greyly’ spent, as well as in the sense that there is no grey turnover in the 
market. This is a problem especially if grey demand is product specific – and it 
probably is, e.g. it is probably smaller in the case of durable consumer goods 
and guaranteed services, and larger in other services. Consequently, the model 
shows a higher degree of price adaptation than is realistic in sectors spared 
from export competition, and so it overestimates the decline in employment as 
well. 
5.3. Debate over the impact of the increases in the minimum wage in 
2001 and 2002: did employment decline? 
Those taking part in a debate organized by the Ministry of Finance12 
agreed that, though the 2001 and 2002 rises in the minimum wage were not 
followed by any major decline in employment, this is true only when the 
national economy is viewed as a whole. In order to measure the actual impacts, 
sectoral, corporate and individual level data have to be assessed and 
instruments (models) suitable for eliminating the effects of other factors must be 
used. Some argued that impact assessments had not fully taken account of the 
impact of the macroeconomic environment. For, owing to diminishing external 
demand, an increasing real exchange rate and certain other factors, corporate 
profitability deteriorated steadily between 2000 and 2002,13 which in itself could 
have been enough to cause employment to decline (Gábor Kátay and Mihály 
Kovács). The 1–1.5% drop in employment established by assessing the impact 
of the 2001 rise in the minimum wage is in contrast to the preceding trend of 
growing employment, but such an expansion could not have continued anyway 
on account of the macroeconomic trends in Hungary (Mihály Kovács). 
                                                 
12  László Halpern, János Köllő and Péter András Szabó delivered presentations at the debate on 
1 December 2005 entitled ‘Expected impacts of the minimum wage in 2006’, while Gábor 
Kátay, Gábor Kézdi and Mihály András Kovács attended the meeting as invited contributors. 
13 This is also confirmed by corporate profitability ratios calculated by the Hungarian National 
Bank, which were not presented at the debate: the data originate from a corporate panel based 
on APEH data, and they show a steady decline between 1999 and 2001. 
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Longer time series show that the growth of wages may also be 
substantially influenced by factors that are independent of the minimum wage. 
Real labour costs were growing faster than productivity even back in 2000, and 
the wage component, which was relatively low even by the standards of other 
Eastern European countries, had started to increase in 1998 after a long period 
of decline. A decline in employment can clearly be demonstrated in some 
branches of the manufacturing sector (explained by growing wage costs and 
external shocks), but this was balanced by a dynamic growth in services, and 
there was no dramatic fall in employment (Gábor Kátay). 
Those attending the meeting did not question the importance of other 
factors, but some of them did note that the impact assessments carried out so 
far did not prove that external factors alone could explain the decline in 
employment in the manufacturing sector. On the one hand, a model that also 
explicitly contains the minimum wage is required in order to separate out the 
impact of the macroeconomic environment on employment, and it is not 
enough just to demonstrate that external shocks alone can determine trends in 
employment (László Halpern). On the other hand, the impacts of the earlier rise 
in the minimum wage were assessed on the basis of the observed data and the 
estimates measured the change in employment on the basis of fixed output; 
accordingly, the 1–1.5% measured is not a decline relative to a trend, but is an 
actual decline (measured with other factors eliminated). Furthermore, the 
impact assessment was based on data from May 2001, when the decline in 
external demand had not yet started (János Köllő).  
The experience of other countries also confirms that it is highly unlikely 
that such a large rise in the minimum wage would not have a negative impact 
on employment. Although there are numerous theoretical models in which it is 
possible for an increase in the minimum wage not to reduce – and indeed even 
to increase – employment, in empirical literature one finds that large rises in the 
minimum wage always have negative (or at least not positive) impacts (e.g. 
Pereira, 1999; Rama, 2000; Maloney and Mendez, 2003). The much quoted 
exception is the paper by Card and Krueger (1994) on the New Jersey case, but 
later papers based on recalculations of their results have refuted the positive 
impact described in the original article (Neumark and Wascher 1994, 1995)14 
(János Köllő). 
5.4. The impacts of the 2001 increase in the minimum wage on income 
distribution  
The minimum wage increases introduced in 2001 and 2002 were welcomed by 
Hungarian society.15 This was probably a consequence of a widely held belief 
                                                 
14 Section 3 discusses the relevant empirical literature in detail, including the debate about the 
positive impact on employment measured in New Jersey. 
15 ‘The majority (81%) of the Hungarian population supports the idea of a substantial – almost 
85% – increase in the minimum wage, despite the fact that most people are aware of the 
potential negative impacts of such a major government intervention … Older people, people 
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that the minimum wage was linked to poverty and that assumed a rise in the 
minimum wage would reduce poverty.16 Some consideration should be given, 
therefore, as to whether a rise in the minimum wage can really be regarded as 
an effective social policy instrument, i.e. whether the increase actually affects 
families and individuals in need, and so whether an increase in the minimum 
wage can be said to alleviate poverty.  
Three issues come in for detailed discussion in this section. The 
minimum wage is an effective tool of social policy if it increases the income of 
the poor rather than that of the more affluent, and if it costs less than other 
instruments. Therefore, we will first review the income distribution of those 
employees affected by the 2001 increase in the minimum wage.  
The study was based on income data that originated from CSO surveys 
on the population and on data from self-assessments. This data source may 
include people who do not include their black labour income in their tax 
returns, stating only their officially received minimum wage. The identification 
of ‘grey employees’ is important for two reasons: on the one hand, statistics 
show them to be poorer than they actually are and thus we see the minimum 
wage more targeted than it actually is. On the other hand, the actual wage – and 
so their productivity – is higher than that of people ‘really living on the 
minimum wage’, so they are less exposed to the risk of becoming unemployed 
when the demand for labour drops as a result of a rise in the minimum wage. 
For this reason we are trying, with the aid of data on consumption, to identify 
people who are probably employed in the grey economy, and to establish the 
actual number of people genuinely living on the minimum wage. 
Finally, using 2000 and 2001 household income data, we assess the 
changes in the income positions of minimum wage earners relative to their own 
earlier incomes and to those of other social groups, in order to see the real 
winners and losers from the rise in the minimum wage. The targeting of the 
increase and the changes in incomes were studied in the group of people 
actually living on the minimum wage, excluding individuals whose 
consumption data are indicative of incomes from grey employment. 
The analysis was based on the merged data sets of 2001 and 2002 in the 
CSO Household Budget Survey (HBS). This survey is based on data supplied 
voluntarily, and since some people refused to participate in the survey and 
                                                                                                                                               
with low schooling and those living in rural areas, as well as employees, are overrepresented 
among the supporters of the proposal’ (Gábos, 2000).  
16 For example: ‘At the same time the group of wealthy people is growing – though not very 
quickly – and as a result of a slight reduction in unemployment and an increase in the 
minimum wage the trend that has seen a growing number of poor people has come to a halt’ 
Ferge (2003); ‘in addition to the unemployed, poverty is greatest among people doing 
unskilled work, semi-skilled and agricultural manual work, and among the Roma population, 
most of whom belong to these groups anyway. The increase in the minimum wage in 2001 to 
HUF 40,000 was a step forward’ Csáky (2001); ‘An increase in the minimum wage, a wage rise 
for public servants, and redistribution based on social policy – despite all of these measures 
income inequalities grew in comparison to 2000’ Németh (2004). 
37 
others did not report all their income sources, the sample contains fewer high 
income and more low income households than there actually are. 
Consequently, the average data on incomes and consumption are shown to be 
lower, and the income and consumption inequalities are shown to be much 
smaller than they actually are (CSO, 1997, pp. 23–24). Because the data sets were 
merged, about a third of the original sample is lost, but from the perspective of 
income distribution this did not cause any material distortion (Figure 9). 
Who is affected by the increases in the minimum wage? 
In our survey employees were considered to have been affected by the 
rise in the minimum wage if what they earned from their main employment 
was between HUF 45,000 and HUF 55,000 per month in the year 2000 sample. 
Accordingly, entrepreneurs were not included because their minimum wage is 
both cost and income at the same time, and so the impacts of the increase in the 
minimum wage are different. Individuals for whom there were substantial 
differences between their household incomes in 2000 and in 2001 that could not 
be explained by changes in their earnings and the composition of their 
households were also excluded from the sample used to assess income changes. 
Having eliminated any suspicious income changes, a total of 481 persons within 
the sample worked for the minimum wage in 2000. Projecting this onto the 
entire population, the increase in the minimum wage is thought to have 
affected some 340,000 employees.17 
Table 6: Features of the 2000 data set and the merged data sets  
 Complete 
2000 HBS 
Merged HBS (2000–01) 
  2000 2001 
Employees  8222 3805 3901 
Minimum wage earners  1038 519* 524 
 ‘Genuine’ minimum 
wage earners ** 
– 481  
 
 
Note: * Of whom 27 did not work in 2001 ** ‘Suspicious’ income changes eliminated. 
This requires data that are available only in the merged data set.   
Source: CSO 2000 and 2001 Household Budget Survey (HBS). 
Figure 9 shows that the overwhelming majority of those affected by the 
rise in the minimum wage are not positioned at the lower end of the income 
distribution scale. The majority of minimum wage earners live in households 
with relatively high per capita equivalent incomes.18 
                                                 
17 A calculation using the original sample weighting factors of the HBS shows 372,000 people. 
18 The equivalent method of calculation of the per capita income takes account of the number of persons 
living in the household as well (a household of four does not spend four times as much as a household 
of one). 
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Figure 9:  Relative income position of minimum wage earners according to per capita 
equivalent income of the household, 2000 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CSO’s 2000 and 2001 HBS. 
 
Having reviewed the main characteristics of those affected by the rise in 
the minimum wage, we conclude that minimum wage earners are typically not 
the primary earners – the breadwinners – in their families, and they do not 
typically fall within the poorest fifth of the population. 
 
Table 7: Key features of people affected by the rise in the minimum wage in comparison 
to other employee groups (2000) 
  
Men 
People 
with at 
least 
secondary 
education 
Proportion of  
breadwinners 
If not the 
breadwinner * 
Number 
of persons 
living in 
household 
Average 
age 
        Wife Child     
Unemployed  56.90% 22.30% 44.20% 47.70% 37.30% 3.6 36.8 
Non-minimum 
wage earner  59.80% 52.40% 62.80% 68.50% 19.80% 3.3 41.6 
Minimum 
wage earner  49.10% 37.40% 49.50% 63.40% 26.80% 3.3 39.1 
High-income 
minimum 
wage earner  42.90% 48.10% 37.20% 58.60% 28.30% 3.1 39.7 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CSO’s 2000 and 2001 HBS.  
Note: * May be other relative or non-relative. 
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The majority (almost 63%) of minimum wage earners living in high-
income households (top two-fifths) are not the breadwinners but spouses, 
partners or children. They typically have higher levels of education – most of 
them have completed secondary school – than the total group of people affected 
by the rise in the minimum wage, in which the highest percentage of 
individuals finished vocational school or apprenticeship school. Most of these 
people live in smaller households of 2–3 members.  
These features support the argument that almost half of the individuals 
affected by the rise in the minimum wage live in higher-income households that 
are not targeted by social policy. The simple sample-average figures conceal the 
effects of composition, and therefore we also analysed the characteristics of 
minimum wage earners by logit regression. First we assessed the employment 
opportunities of minimum wage earners, along with the differences in these 
opportunities relative to those of other active people. In this case the variables 
of gender, age and level of education were applied to assess productivity, and 
the region variable was used to see the opportunities for employment near the 
place of residence. Compared to the total active population, most minimum- 
wage earners live outside the central Hungarian region and have at best 
completed primary education or have skilled worker qualifications; most of 
them are women (Table 8).   
Table 8: Characteristics of minimum wage earners compared to the entire active 
population, 2000 
 
Average 
partial effect  p-value 
   
South Great Plain 0.00042 0.97 
South Transdanubia –0.01744 0.18 
North Great Plain 0.00735 0.57 
Northern Hungary –0.01406 0.26 
Central Hungary –0.02730 0.01 
Western Hungary 0.00516 0.71 
Skilled worker qualification 0.00137 0.88 
Secondary education –0.01752 0.05 
Tertiary education  –0.08168 0.00 
Men –0.04021 0.00 
Age 0.00130 0.50 
Age2 –0.00003 0.26 
   
Number of elements in
sample: 8534 
Pseudo-R2: 0.0211 
Notes: 1. Basis of comparison: Central Transdanubia and primary education. 2. 
Variables significant at 5% are set in bold.  
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Secondly, we assessed whether support through the minimum wage 
might be justified on the basis of the role occupied in a household. In this test, 
the position in the family is approached through the breadwinner status19 and 
the age variable, the number of persons being the number of those to be 
potentially supported. The issue was assessed separately by gender, assuming 
that the value of work carried out in the household may differ between men 
and women. The relationship between the role and the minimum wage earner 
status was also assessed in comparison to the active population and to the 15–59 
age group.  
We found that, compared to the active population (Table 9), breadwinner 
men are less likely to be affected by an increase in the minimum wage. The 
likelihood of belonging to this group, however, is not affected by the number of 
persons in the household, nor the age of the individual. In the case of women, 
none of the variables were found to be significant. 
Table 9: Characteristics of minimum wage earners in comparison to the active 
population  
 Men Women 
 
Average partial 
effect p-value 
Average partial 
effect p-value 
Number of 
individuals in 
household –0.0017 0.63 –0.0016 0.755 
Breadwinner –0.0448 0.01 –0.0055 0.71 
Age 0.0034 0.24 0.0045 0.16 
Age2 0.0000 0.17 0.0001 0.09 
     
Number of elements 
in sample: 4547 3987 
Pseudo-R2: 0.0057 0.0018 
Note: Variables significant at 5% are set in bold. 
 
In the case of the (active and inactive) population aged 15–59 (Table 10) the 
more people living in the household, the smaller the probability of women 
belonging to the group affected by the increase in the minimum wage. This is 
probably explained by the fact that, in a household of several individuals, it is more 
useful for the woman to stay at home than to go out to work for the minimum wage. 
In the case of women, however, being or not being the breadwinner has no 
significant impact. The situation is just the opposite in the case of men: the 
                                                 
19 The husband or the male partner is regarded in the HBS as the breadwinner in a single-family 
household. If one parent plus child(ren) make up a household, the parent is the breadwinner. 
In the case of multi-family households, selection is based on activity, gender and age – in that 
order – from among the breadwinners as defined in the case of a single-family household. The 
same order applies to households not forming a family (CSO, 1997, p. 64). 
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number of individuals in the household has no significant impact; but, at the 
same time, if the individual is the breadwinner, he is more likely to be affected 
by the rise in the minimum wage. 
Table 10: Characteristics of minimum wage earners in comparison to the 15–59 age 
group 
 Men Women 
 
Average partial 
effect p-value 
Average partial 
effect p-value 
Number of 
individuals in 
household 0.0012 0.635 –0.0038 0.084 
Breadwinner 0.0194 0.004 0.0047 0.594 
     
Number of elements 
in sample: 6326 7359 
Pseudo-R2: 0.0024 0.0011 
Note: Variables significant at 10% are set in bold.  
 
In summary, then: minimum wage earners have lower levels of 
education than other employees; women make up a larger proportion than men 
of minimum wage earners; and most of them live outside the region of Central 
Hungary, where the unemployment rate is lower. Most men on the minimum 
wage are not breadwinners, and most breadwinner women live in households 
made up of smaller numbers of people. In terms of their employment 
opportunities, minimum wage earners are in a less advantageous position than 
the average employee, but most of them are not breadwinners and live in 
households that include other wage earners as well. 
Do minimum wage earners actually earn the minimum wage? 
On the basis of anecdotal evidence, we assume that a certain proportion 
of minimum wage earners receive ‘grey’ income as well. In the CSO HBS data 
we tried to select minimum wage earners with additional grey income by 
comparing the income of the household to its expenditure and by reviewing the 
structure of expenditure. 
People who, according to their household expenditure, belonged to an 
income group at least two quintiles higher than their income would suggest 
were regarded as making their living in the grey economy. 
This was then refined by assessing the structure of expenditure. We 
assumed that the structure of the expenditure of minimum wage earners with 
additional grey income was similar to the structure of expenditure that 
corresponded to their actual income. When we investigate the main spending 
categories, in the top quintiles we find larger amounts and higher percentages 
of income being spent on transport and cultural/educational activities. Though 
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spending on eating out involves smaller amounts, it is also closely related to 
income. Accordingly, individuals who belonged to the bottom two quintiles by 
income, but whose spending on transport, education/culture and restaurants 
exceeded the average of the top three quintiles (both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of income), were treated as recipients of grey income.  
Based on the above considerations, a total of 1,057 persons – almost 4.5% 
of the total sample – were categorized as being involved in the grey economy. 
Some 5.2% of the economically active population qualify as earners of grey 
income, and such people make up 4% of the minimum wage earners (41 
persons in the sample). Accordingly, it cannot be argued that the majority of 
minimum wage earners are registered as employed just to evade taxes: indeed 
the majority of people officially registered as minimum wage earners are 
actually paid that much. 
This is also confirmed by the findings of a multivariate estimate (Table 
11). Within the active population, most of those working in the grey economy 
live in Central Hungary or in South and North Transdanubia, and they have 
higher levels of education. However, we cannot say that being registered as a 
minimum wage earner would increase the likelihood of involvement in the grey 
economy. 
Table 11: Likelihood of participation in the grey economy  
Variables  
Average partial 
effect p-value 
   
Men –0.00357 0.19 
South Great Plain 0.00093 0.88 
South Transdanubia 0.04055 0.00 
North Great Plain –0.00005 0.99 
Northern Hungary 0.00642 0.34 
Central Hungary 0.03206 0.00 
Western Hungary 0.02039 0.01 
Apprenticeship school  0.01203 0.01 
Secondary education 0.01870 0.00 
Tertiary education 0.03207 0.00 
Minimum wage earner  –0.00793 0.18 
Entrepreneur  0.07391 0.00 
Age 0.00005 0.86 
Age 2 –0.00001 0.00 
   
Number of elements in 
sample: 
24022 
Pseudo-R2: 0.0485 
Note: Variables significant at 5% are set in bold. 
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Winners and losers  
The winners and losers from the increase in the minimum wage were 
identified by grouping the individuals concerned according to the change in 
their relative standing and their income in terms of HUF: (1) people whose 
income position improved significantly; (2) people whose income position 
declined significantly; and (3) people whose income position did not vary 
significantly.20 The main characteristics of categorization by the two aspects are 
presented in Table 12. 
Table 12: Impact of the increase in the minimum wage on the income of the individuals 
concerned  
 Based on change in HUF  Based on relative income change  
 Worse position 
Unchange
d position 
Improved 
position 
Worse 
position 
Unchange
d position 
Improve
d 
position 
Average annual nominal 
personal income change 
(HUF) 
–191,543 85,891 274,193 –100,039 102,306 292,406 
Average annual 
personal income change 
adjusted for inflation 
(HUF) 
–174,447 78,225 249,720 –91,110 93,174 266,307 
Number of persons 58 290 133 85 300 96 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CSO’s 2000 and 2001 HBS. 
Both categorizations have their advantages and disadvantages. In the 
case of uncertain income data, the relative income change is more precise, for it 
only takes account of the positions of individuals relative to one another. 
However, in the case of this categorization – regardless of the change in income 
in HUF – the income position of those who belonged to the top quintile in 2000 
cannot improve and the position of those in the bottom quintile in 2000 cannot 
deteriorate. This error is eliminated by grouping on the basis of income change in 
HUF. In this case, distortion is caused by incorrect income data. 
Figure 10 shows that the changes in the relative income position of the 
individuals concerned are very significantly affected by their initial income. The 
                                                 
20 The following approach was used in separating the groups. The position of people whose per 
capita (equivalent) household income dropped by at least 10%, or whose relative income 
position dropped by at least one quintile, were categorized as persons with significantly 
worse income positions. The position of people whose per capita household income increased 
by at least 30%, or who moved at least one quintile up, were categorized as persons with 
significantly improved income positions. Changes exceeding 12 percentiles were taken into 
account in moving people from quintile to quintile.  
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income position of minimum wage earners living in poor households (bottom 
income quintile) improved substantially, while that of more affluent individuals 
more often deteriorated. The income of poorer minimum wage earners 
increased at a higher rate than the income of non-minimum wage earning (or 
unemployed) poor people. An assessment of concrete personal income changes 
(Figure 11) shows that a relative improvement in the top quintile is observed in 
the form of higher-than-average income increases (HUF 210,000 per annum, 
rather than HUF 110,000). 
Figure 10: Change in relative income position (based on household income) 
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Notes: 1. The figure shows the median of the differences between the percentiles of the 
individuals, calculated on the basis of the 2001 and the 2000 per capita household 
income. Accordingly, in the first quintile a 5 percentile change across the whole 
sample means that the relative income position of the average individual in the first 
quintile has improved by 5 percentiles. 2. The values above the columns show the 
number of individuals belonging to the given group (number of elements in sample, 
without weighting). 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CSO’s 2000 and 2001 HBS. 
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Figure 11: Average change in personal income by quintile (HUF) 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CSO’s 2000 and 2001 HBS. 
 
The income position of minimum wage earners living in poor 
households (bottom quintile) improved significantly, but this involves very few 
people: Figure 10 shows that only 31 persons – or 6.4% of minimum wage 
earners – live in such households. As Figure 12 shows, a large proportion of the 
winners (48% or 57%, depending on categorization) live in the top three 
quintiles. 
Figure 12: Position of the winners from the increase in the minimum wage, based on 
the per capita equivalent income of the household (2000) 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CSO’s 2000 and 2001 HBS. 
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Figure 13: Income position of losers from the rise in the minimum wage (2000) 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CSO’s 2000 and 2001 HBS. 
 
In 12% and 14% of all cases, the deterioration in the income position of 
the household (in terms of income change in HUF and in terms of relative 
income change, respectively) was caused by the fact that the minimum wage 
earning family member was made redundant between 2000 and 2001. In 2000 
some 5.4% of minimum wage earners fell into this category. None of those who 
lost their jobs belonged to the bottom income quintile (Table 13), but this may be 
explained by the small number of elements in the sample. Most of them are 
men (16 out of 26), the majority of them with low levels of education. Their 
personal income dropped by an average of HUF 129,000 (the median drop was 
HUF 151,000) which is quite a considerable reduction in view of the income 
changes described above (Figures 11 and 12). 
Table 13: Relative income position of people made redundant  
Quintile 
Number of 
elements in 
sample 
Percentage of those 
made redundant  
Number of those 
made redundant 
1 31 0% 0 
2 103 4.9% 5 
3 116 8.6% 10 
4 121 4.1% 5 
5 110 5.5% 6 
Total 481 5.4 % 26 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CSO’s 2000 and 2001 HBS. 
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The following is a review of the extent to which the changes in the 
position of poorer families (bottom three quintiles 21 ) depended on the 
characteristics of the minimum wage earner and of the household. The findings 
of regression analyses22 show (Table 14) that a larger proportion of the people 
whose income position improved had tertiary or secondary education, and a 
smaller proportion of them lived in South Transdanubia and Northern 
Hungary, where unemployment rates are relatively high. A larger proportion of 
people whose income position deteriorated was made up of men, a smaller 
proportion of them having tertiary education. 
Table 14: Factors determining changes in income position  
Based on change in HUF Based on relative change in income Variables Improved Unchanged Deteriorated Improved Unchanged Deteriorated 
Great Plain –0.0591 0.1147 –0.0557 –0.0822 0.1272 –0.0450 
South Transdanubia –0.2115 0.2287 –0.0172 –0.2520 0.2624 –0.0105 
Northern Hungary –0.1248 0.0967 0.0281 –0.1435 0.1849 –0.0414 
Central and Western 
Hungary 
–0.0999 0.1007 –0.0008 –0.1001 0.0433 0.0568 
Secondary 
education  0.0932 –0.0284 –0.0648 0.1519 –0.0585 –0.0934 
Tertiary education 0.2712 –0.1620 –0.1092 0.2664 –0.2537 –0.0127 
Men –0.0139 –0.0019 0.0158 0.0214 –0.0876 0.0662 
Age –0.0051 0.0044 0.0021 –0.0155 0.0103 0.0105 
Age2 0.0001 –0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 –0.0002 –0.0002 
Change in number 
of household 
members  
–0.2851 0.4397 0.0930 –0.2724 0.5317 0.1060 
Change in number 
of employees  0.1048 –0.2126 –0.0275 0.0593 –0.1756 –0.0097 
       
Number of elements 
in sample: 250 250 
Pseudo-R2: 0.0993 0.1174 
Notes: 1. Variables significant at 10% are set in bold. 2. The basis of comparison in the 
case of the regions was the South Transdanubia region, in the case of education it was 
the primary school and the apprenticeship school. 3. Average partial effect are 
presented in the table. 
 
In summary, then: in addition to people living in poorer households 
(bottom income quintile) those who gained from the increase in the minimum 
wage included a lot of people in better income positions. Though the incomes of 
winners in better income positions grew at a smaller rate, these people 
definitely count as winners. By contrast, people in higher-income quintiles and 
those made redundant are losers. Winners tend to have higher levels of 
                                                 
21 The bottom two quintiles contained few observations, and therefore minimum wage earners 
in the bottom three quintiles were studied. 
22 Due to the small number of people reporting deterioration or improvement in their income 
positions, the regression results are not precise. 
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schooling and the data do not confirm any significant improvement in the 
position of people living in less well developed regions, in the wake of the 
increase in the minimum wage. 
6. Expected impacts of the 2006 increase in the minimum wage in 
Hungary  
6.1. People to be affected by the increase in the minimum wage in 2006 
On 28 June 2005 the government proposed introducing a HUF 63,000 
general minimum wage, along with a HUF 70,000 minimum wage for people 
with secondary qualifications and HUF 77,000 for people with tertiary 
qualifications. 
In the event, following agreement with the National Interest 
Reconciliation Council,  the government issued a decree on 14 December 2005 
to the effect that as from 1 January 2006, 1 January 2007 and 1 January 2008 the 
minimum wage would rise to HUF 62,500, HUF 65,500 and HUF 69,000, 
respectively. A differentiated minimum wage was introduced, but in the form 
of a guaranteed minimum wage for people working in jobs that require at least 
secondary qualifications. After a series of gradual increases, by 2008 this will 
equal 125% of the minimum wage, provided the individual has at least 2 years’ 
work experience.  
A forecast of the impact of the original proposal for a phased increase in 
the differentiated minimum wage (HUF 63,000 – HUF 70,000 – HUF 77,000) was 
produced by the Ministry of Labour and Employment Policy (MoLEP, 2005) on 
the basis of data from the wage tariff survey of May 2005, carried out by the 
Public Employment Service. The wage tariff survey covered organizations 
employing at least 5 people, and thus the forecast also applied only to such 
organizations. 
According to the MoLEP calculations, the impact of the increase in the 
minimum wage will be felt primarily by (mainly light industry and 
agricultural) enterprises that employ older or less well qualified persons in 
regions with higher rates of unemployment (South Great Plain and the North 
Great Plain), and by small businesses with 5–9 employees. The introduction of a 
minimum wage dependent on qualifications as well would affect some 31% of 
employees in businesses with more than 4 employees – or a total of 580,000 
persons. A HUF 63,000 minimum wage that is not dependent on the level of 
qualifications would affect some 27% of the group, or some 510,000 people in 
the private sector.  
This estimate, however, applied only to enterprises employing at least 5 
people. According to the CSO’s Labour Survey, though, some 300,000 people 
work for enterprises that employ fewer than 5 people, and there are some 
500,000 people working as sole traders. The majority of these people work in 
agriculture or the service sector, and so the increase could affect 25–40% of this 
49 
group, too. Overall, then, up to 50% may be affected. Raising the minimum 
wage could, therefore, have an impact on some 700,000–900,000 people 
employed in the private sector.  
In terms of headcount, the general rise in the minimum wage, plus the 
differentiated increase, will affect primarily the retail sector, vehicle repairs, 
economic services and construction (Figure 15). In retail alone, among 
enterprises that have more than 5 employees, the rise in the minimum wage 
will affect some 120,000 people. In terms of the proportions of employees, the 
hospitality and catering and the textile sectors will be most affected, with the 
statutory wage increase involving almost 50% of employees (Figure 15).  
Figure 15: The number (in thousands of people) and proportion (%) affected by the 
HUF 63,000 minimum wage 
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Source: Wage tariff 2005 May, MoLEP (2005). 
 
According to the MoLEP forecast, the most substantial decline in 
employment is likely to take place in the light industry, while in agriculture and 
tourism we might see a significant increase in grey employment, rather than 
any particular loss of jobs. No negative change is expected in construction and 
retail, for wages are expected to increase in these sectors anyway. The wage-
increasing effect of a higher minimum wage should not exceed 1% in most 
sectors (e.g. chemical industry, engineering, the energy sector, transport, 
finance), but in heavily affected sectors it could reach 3–7%.  
In terms of company size, small enterprises will be most affected. In the 
case of entities that employ fewer than 50 people, some 25–45% of employees 
could be affected by the increase, with entities employing 5–9 people bearing 
the brunt of the change. 
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Figure 15: The number (in thousands of people) and proportion (%) affected by the 
HUF 63,000 minimum wage, by size of enterprise  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1000 -
employee
300-999 emp. 20-229 emp. 20-49 emp. 10-19 emp. 5-9 emp.
th
ou
sa
nd
 p
eo
pl
e
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Number of affected (left scale) Share of affected (right scale)
 
Source: Wage tariff 2005 May, MoLEP (2005). 
 
The South Great Plain and South Transdanubia are the regions most 
affected: almost 30% of the employees of businesses employing at least 5 people 
could be affected by the wage increase. Many people could be affected in 
Central Hungary as well. 
Figure 17: The number (in thousands of people) and proportion (%) affected by the 
HUF 63,000 minimum wage in the various regions  
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Source: Wage tariff 2005 May, MoLEP (2005). 
 
According to the MoLEP forecast, some 20,000 employees will be 
affected by the wage increase in the public sector. It should be noted that, as a 
consequence of the minimum wage previously introduced in the public sector 
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for people with tertiary education, the earnings of these people are already 
higher than HUF 70,000, and consequently only the general minimum wage 
and the minimum wage for those with secondary education would have any 
effect (MoLEP, 2005).  
6.2. Discussion of the expected impact of the 2006 increase and 
differentiation  
The wage increase starts from a higher base  
Participants of the discussion at the Ministry of Finance agreed that the 
2001 and 2002 rises in the minimum wage occurred in circumstances somewhat 
different from those in which the minimum wage will be increased in 2006. On 
the one hand, in 2000 the minimum wage was probably below the wage level 
prevailing in the market and was not really effective, whereas the 2006 increase 
– though smaller – will certainly be effective and may therefore have a more 
substantial impact (Gábor Kézdi). On the other hand, the economic prospects 
are more favourable this time round, with growing unemployment meaning 
that there is an ample reserve of labour and no strong pressure to increase 
prices (Gábor Kátay). 
There was no consensus on the size of the increase: one group considered 
it to be substantial, given the current wage level and the idea for dealing with 
better-educated people (János Köllő, Gábor Kézdi); others argued that the 
increase was balanced somewhat by the reduced rate of health contributions 
and by the cut in social security contributions scheduled for 2007. In view of 
these reductions, employers may be more willing to accept a wage-cost increase 
in the short term (Gábor Kátay).  
Opinions varied on the budgetary impact: Gábor Kézdi argued that the 
increase could affect a lot of people in the public sector as well, leading to 
increased expenditure; Balázs Romhányi, meanwhile, held that the increase 
introduced in 2001 for those people in the public sector with tertiary education 
had gone some considerable way down the road, and that the next increase 
would impose a smaller burden on the budget. 
The impact of differentiation  
There was agreement at the discussion that differentiation in the 
minimum wage by qualification was definitely harmful. Although some 
weighty economic arguments do support differentiation, these relate to some 
differentiation based on the productivity of employees, granting a concession to 
groups with lower productivity (young people, older employees, people living 
in regions short of capital). This aspect is hard to see in the government’s 
proposal. Its approach will lead to tariff-based wage regulation and a rigid 
wage structure, which – especially in a low-inflation environment – will 
significantly impede the flexible adaptation of the labour market (János Köllő). 
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It is no coincidence that there is no previous example to go on of such a gross 
intervention in the way enterprises operate. That is why it is not possible to rely 
on other countries’ experience in forecasting the impacts (Gábor Kézdi). 
Differentiation by level of qualifications ignores the fact that, within 
various types of jobs, the level of schooling varies greatly in Hungary (e.g. 20% 
of janitors and 35–40% of commercial drivers have a Certificate of Secondary 
Education 23 ) and there are people with higher qualifications working in 
virtually every job category. The wage advantage of skilled workers varies 
widely by occupation, and therefore the basis for differentiation is not quite 
clear: it is true, however, that it will definitely force employers to adapt, and 
this will inevitably result in losses (János Köllő).  
The institutional framework and the goal of the minimum wage agreement  
In addition to the impact of the specific increases in question, the 
discussion also touched on the whole idea of setting minimum wages, as well as 
on the appropriate criteria. László Halpern argued that the increased risk of 
unemployment and job losses that is consequent on an increase in the minimum 
wage is not taken into account by the trade unions: only the government can 
express this concern in the tripartite negotiations. That is why the government 
should not let the unions seize the initiative in the tripartite discussions. 
János Köllő noted that the impact of the minimum wage should not be 
judged on the basis of change in the employment of the median voter (this is 
precisely what is meant by the aggregated employment level). Instead, it is the 
positions of unskilled (and older) employees that should be assessed: the 
employment of this group has declined dramatically over the past 15 years, and 
today it is extremely low by comparison with the EU average. People with low 
levels of qualifications are not typically employed in the service sector: they 
find employment in manufacturing jobs, on an assembly line or operating a 
machine – and it is there that the impact of the rise in the minimum wage is felt 
immediately. 
According to Gábor Kézdi, the minimum wage is not the way to go about 
restoring respect for work. Although it may increase the willingness to work, in a 
labour market where employment is determined by demand, an increase in supply 
is of no help. This is one of the reasons why this is not an adequate tool for 
reducing poverty either. András Semjén also noted that using an increased 
minimum wage as a social policy tool is probably very expensive: a similar 
effect could be achieved by providing assistance or tax relief and would have 
far less harmful side-effects. 
                                                 
23 Based on CSO’s quarterly labour survey for the 2nd and the 4th quarter of 2004. 
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Appendix   
 Employment impacts of a rise in the minimum wage, based on Kertesi 
and Köllő (2004)  
Table F.1: The results of the 3SLS estimate  
Source: Kertesi and Köllő (2004).  
 
54 
Budgetary effects of an increase in the minimum wage based on Halpern 
et al. (2004)  
Table F.2: Change in PIT and contribution revenue subject to expansion of grey 
economy  
 
 
Source: Presentation by László Halpern, based on Halpern et al. (2004). Increases in the 
minimum wage in Hungary 2001–06, workshop discussion. Ministry of Finance, 1 
December 2005.   
 
Table F.3: Change in general government deficit depending on minimum wage and 
proportion of grey economy (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: idem.  
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